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Reciprocity or the Higher Ground? 
The Treatment of Ethnic Russians in Georgia 






Since the fall of the Soviet Union, relations between Georgia and Russia have been far 
from amicable, as disagreements over international alignments, territorial pretensions, 
and historical legacies have created a significant number of damaging rifts between the 
political elites of the two countries. However, prior to the arrest of four Russian citizens 
accused of espionage in Georgia in September 2006, it was thought that the elite political 
conflicts had only a marginal effect on relations between average Russians and 
Georgians, as manifested for example on the streets of Moscow or Tbilisi. However, the 
so-called „spy scandal‟ of September-October 2006 set in motion an extended targeting 
and expulsion of ethnic Georgians from Russia, both those living legally in the country 
and those without official permission. Russian government officials, police officers, and 
mass media outlets alike were accused of fomenting this persecution, which has resulted 
in the closing of Georgian businesses alleged to be operating illegally and so far in the 
departure of an estimated 4-5,000 ethnic Georgians, either by order of expulsion or out of 
fear of the possible consequences of further life in Moscow. 
 
The treatment of ethnic Georgians in Russia could have resulted in a backlash from the 
Georgian side against the considerable minority of ethnic Russians in Georgia. This Issue 
Brief examines the conduct of Georgian officials, journalists, and citizens towards ethnic 
Russians in the aftermath of the expulsions from Russia and intends to determine the 
extent of any appearances of discrimination in response. In the end, few such 
manifestations were found, as Georgian officials, possibly seizing the initiative only for 
political reasons, took steps to reassure the Russian minority in Georgia of their safety. 
Furthermore, the bans on transportation links, postal service, and money transfers levied 
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by Russia on Georgia have also had an adverse effect on ethnic Russian organizations 
and individuals.  
 
In order to provide a background for the analysis of majority-minority relations, this Brief 
will first look at the formation and composition of the ethnic Georgian and Russian 
communities, in Russia and Georgia respectively. Next, an examination of the treatment 
of ethnic Russians will be undertaken, comparing events in Georgia to those which 
happened in Russia in the fall of 2006 and afterward. Over the course of the research on 
the ethnic Russian community in Georgia, a series of 20 interviews was undertaken 
among leaders of organizations, religious figures and ordinary citizens in order to obtain 
their views on the situation in Russia. The findings revealed a praiseworthy sense of 
judgment on the part of Georgian actors in response to the crisis, although overall rhetoric 
towards Russia still demonstrates negative tendencies, which increasingly may affect the 
level of tolerance in the country.  
 
The Ethnic Georgian Community in Russia 
 
Political ties between the two countries have resulted in several major waves of  
immigration of Georgians to Russia over the past several centuries. The largest of these 
movements occurred towards the end of the 18
th
 and the beginning of the 19
th
 centuries as 
Georgia‟s incorporation into the Russian Empire brought a large influx of labor migrants 
northward into Russia. However, the majority of migrants since this initial flow were 
members of Georgia‟s political, cultural, and academic elite, looking for greater 
opportunities in the more developed and cosmopolitan urban centers in Russia. 
Throughout the Soviet period, the Georgian diaspora in Russia was largely made up of 
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The collapse of the USSR caused both economic and political upheavals in the newly 
independent republics, especially Georgia. Suffering the effects of an economic crisis and 
an emergent civil war, Georgian citizens looked north to Russia for increased economic 
prosperity and employment opportunities. The 2002 Census of the Russian Federation put 
the number of ethnic Georgians living in Russia at 197,934 (up from 130,688 counted in 
the 1989 Soviet Census).  However, these figures may underestimate the actual numbers 
of labor migrants, as hundreds of thousands of illegal workers are thought to have crossed 
the border and settled in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. Current estimates by 
Russian authorities claim that between 400,000 and one million ethnic Georgians 




Of great importance, and due to difficult living conditions in Georgia, the Georgian 
diaspora in Russia sends an estimated $4bn in remittances home to Georgia annually 
(Russian sources put the figure at over $1bn), a significant aid to the welfare of relatives 
living in Georgia.
3
 The significance of Georgians for the Russian society and economy 
can be seen from the following. In addition to Georgians working in the professional, 
artistic, and culinary spheres, migrants as a whole from the Caucasus have entered the 
manual labor force in Russia to engage in work and perform tasks that the average 
Russian refuses to do. With organizations and cultural centers, ethnic Georgians in Russia 
have established themselves as a vibrant community, led by established Georgian leaders 
and public figures within Russian society. 
 
The Ethnic Russian Community in Georgia 
 




 centuries were remarkably diverse, 
contributing to the development of a vibrant community in Georgia. Beginning with the 
deployment of Cossack warriors into the Caucasus to serve as border guards in the early 
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1800‟s, the Russian Empire also coordinated the resettlement of large groups of 
Sectarians into Georgia. Working professionals and military officers were also stationed 
in Georgia as part of Tsarist colonial policies directed towards the resettlement of loyal 
Slavs into the Caucasus. Such policies were later expanded during the Soviet period 
under the umbrella of „Russification‟; ethnically Russian specialists and technicians were 
brought into Georgia to assist with the industrialization and modernization of the country.   
 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the majority of ethnic Russians living in 
Georgia returned to the Russian Federation, partly as a result of the deterioration of 
economic conditions and partly because of the overt nationalism that was gaining 
prominence in Georgian politics. The closure of numerous military bases, as well as 
industrial and agricultural centers made many professional educated Russians redundant, 
leaving them little choice but to return to Russia in search of greater opportunities. In 
addition, the strength of the kin system and closely knit communities at work in Georgia 
contributed to an unwelcome atmosphere for Russians left out of these familial 
connections. Roughly 75% of the Russian population counted in the last Soviet Census of 
1989 left Georgia in the following decade. 
 
According to the 2002 Census, 67,671 Russians (down from 341,162 in 1989) are 
currently living in Georgia, concentrated mostly in the urban areas, but with smaller 
numbers, including those remaining Sectarians, residing in regional villages.  Remaining 
Russians have founded several functioning civil society organizations to bring together 
members of the community and represent their mutual interests. Benefiting from some of 
the left-over privileges given to the Russian language during the Soviet period, schools, 
newspapers and television programs are still run in the Russian language, although with 
less and less frequency.  
 
The 2006 “Spy Scandal” and Expulsions of Georgians from Moscow 
 
In order to trace the immediate consequences of such international affairs on both the 
Georgian and Russian diaspora, one must first examine the series of events that have 
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inflated the tension between the two countries. Since achieving its independence in 1991, 
Georgia experienced a pair of disastrous civil wars concerning the breakaway republics 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Throughout these conflicts, accusations were made that 
Russian forces, both volunteer and state-sponsored, were assisting rebels in the region to 
combat Georgian troops. When the West declined to send any peacekeeping troops into 
the conflict zone, President Shevardnadze was forced to signed a Russian-brokered peace 
agreement, which not only included the deployment of Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) peacekeeping forces (with the majority being Russian) in the conflict zones, 
but also led to Georgia‟s accession into the CIS. Russia was now firmly entrenched 
between the Georgians and Abkhazians, but in sending in troops, had frozen the 
boundaries to allow for de facto Abkhaz independence. Relations between the two 
countries further deteriorated in 2001-2002 during the Second Chechen War, when the 
Russian government accused Georgian authorities of harboring Chechen militants who 
had crossed the Georgian border to seek a safe haven in the Pankisi Gorge from where 
they were supposedly planning attacks. To this day, tensions over the „frozen conflicts‟ 
and military assistance have contributed to a sense of mistrust from both sides. 
 
The overthrow of the Shevardnadze government and election of the decidedly Western-
oriented Mikheil Saakashvili to the Georgian presidency aggravated relations to the 
Russian government, which saw this political shift as a direct affront to Moscow‟s 
interests in the region. Saakashvili‟s drive for inclusion into Western structures such as 
NATO and the EU and his anti-Russian rhetoric have contributed to this demise of 
healthy relations. Russia‟s responses to pro-Western politics have been pointed, including 
the introduction of sanctions on Georgian mineral water and wine, thereby closing off the 
largest market for two of Georgia‟s most significant exports commodities (wine and 
mineral water) in the spring of 2006, as well as continued overt support for the break-
away territories.  
 
The low point of this process of deterioration, which almost led to military conflict, was 
the so-called „spy scandal‟ that occurred in the fall of 2006. On September, 27, 2006, 
Georgian security officials arrested four Russian military officers in Georgia on charges 
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of espionage. Although the suspects were handed over to the Organization of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) within a week after their arrest, anger and outrage 
lingered on the side of the Russian government, which vehemently denounced the 
charges as purely politically motivated and completely unsubstantiated. All air, sea, land, 
and postal links from Georgia into Russia were halted, a coastal blockade was imposed 
and the Russian embassy in Georgia abolished the visa regime for Georgian citizens 
looking to travel and/or work in Russia.
4
 In addition, Russia decided to close its 
Caucasian Military headquarters in Tbilisi, which was at the center of the crisis, as 
Georgian policemen surrounded the facility in a show of force for western consumption 
while one of the alleged Russian spies remained inside.  In response to the „parading of 
the spies‟ on TV stations and initial reluctance to hand them over to the Russians, 
Russian state officials and media outlets deliberately filled the airwaves with derogatory 
language and stereotypes of economic affairs of Georgian nationals in Moscow.  
 
Adding to the atmosphere of persecution, Russian authorities began to physically target 
Georgian citizens living both legally and illegally in the Russian Federation. Georgian 
businesses, restaurants, and casinos were subject to intrusive searches and arbitrary 
investigations, leading in some cases to the permanent closure of such enterprises. Police 
targeted places where Georgian nationals frequented in Moscow, even going as far as 
requesting school lists to verify documents with those with Georgian-sounding last 
names. Basic rights were denied to the detainees, who were handed expulsion decisions 
without having access to a lawyer or opportunity to appeal. Over the course of October 
and November 2006, over 2,300 Georgian nationals were expelled from Russia, another 
2,000 left on their own means after being given expulsion decisions, and an additional 
undefined number more left for Georgia because of the climate of harassment.
5
 Polls 
taken at the time show that support for the expulsions went far beyond the official level, 
as according to the Levada Center, 38% of Russian respondents supported the idea of 
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deporting all Georgians from Russia.
6
 The selective targeting of ethnic Georgians, 





Treatment of Ethnic Russians in Georgia 
 
During the process of the campaign targeting Georgians in Russia, reciprocal actions 
against Russian citizens living in Georgia would not have been an unlikely development 
in the political relations between the two countries. However, interviews with numerous 
representatives of the Russian community in Tbilisi indicate that a deterioration of their 
situation was not experienced as a result of the crisis. First, the Georgian government 
took specific steps, though most likely as public relations stunts, to display their tolerance 
for ethnic Russians still living in Georgia. What is more, the Georgian population did not 
retaliate in the same manner against Russians living in Georgia, looking beyond the 
political conflict and staying away from further inflammatory actions. 
 
At the outset of the scandal, Russian authorities saw a possibility of the tense situation 
becoming hostile and took precautionary steps to decrease the presence of Russians in 
Georgia. The Russian embassy in Tbilisi was closed, the ambassador was recalled to 
Moscow, and a „partial evacuation‟ of diplomatic families was undertaken to Russia.8 
Notices were sent out to Russian citizens living in Georgia, advising about the tense 
relations and recommending that they leave. Georgian officials, including President 
Saakashvili, were quick to respond with statements welcoming their presence in Georgia 
and promising no threats from Georgian society.
9
 When air links were cut, an additional 
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178 Russian citizens were stranded in Georgia, and upon their arrival to the airport, they 
were handed a basket of grapes and two bottles of wine, one white and one red, by 
Georgian officials before their departure.
10
 Furthermore, as the processing of visas was 
being halted from the Russian side, Georgian officials acted to simplify the procedures 
for Russians applying for Georgian visas and open more points at the border for Russian 




The measures taken by Russian authorities against Georgia also hurt Russian citizens in 
Georgia who rely on close ties between the two countries. The abolition of the visa 
regime and transport links affected every citizen of Georgia, regardless of their ethnicity. 
Actions by Russia to cut off all transport and communication links with Georgia 
significantly affected ethnic Russians living in Georgia who are in close contact with 
relatives in Russia. Ethnic Russians looking to attend weddings, funerals and other family 
events in Russia were prevented from making the trip, besides spending exorbitant money 
on passage through a third country. Most could simply not afford the travel, and some 
with set itineraries were left without compensation. The severing of postal service cut off 
communication links between ethnic Russians in Georgia and their relatives in Russia, as 
many were forced to spend much higher sums of money on long-distance telephone calls 
to communicate. Moreover, remittances from Russia to relatives in Georgia were cut off, 
except when an alternate route was found through Ukraine. The Russian embassy, which 
distributes most of the funding for Russian societal organizations in Georgia, ceased its 
cultural and humanitarian activities when it was evacuated. Russians in Georgia were left 
without the benefits of such programs; many of the budgets and activities of these 
organizations simply dried up, devoid of any other sources of funding. The situation was 
reversed upon the Russian ambassador‟s return in late January. 
 
In the end, the Georgian public as a whole was able to separate the discord of the political 
arena from its own everyday interactions with ethnic Russians. Upon analysis of 
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Georgian mass media outlets beginning in late September 2006, no analogous statements 
from officials or journalists, deprecating ethnic Russians or calls for steps to be taken 
against them were discovered in Georgia. No Russian representatives reported examples 
of ill-treatment or discrimination during the months of the scandal, and in fact most made 
a point of emphasizing the high level of tolerance expressed by the Georgian people 
towards them.
12
 Cases of harassment or discrimination against Russians living in Georgia 
were not reported over the course of the campaign being carried out in Moscow. This 
being said, the anti-Russian rhetoric propagated by Georgian officials over recent years 
has not helped the perception among the Georgian public that Russia is an enemy state 
and any cooperation with it is tantamount to treason. One Russian NGO representative 
expressed his dismay over this attitude and thought that this state of affairs would 
ultimately negatively affect the remaining Russian community in Georgia. Sporadic 
incidents have been reported of discrimination against the ethnic Russian population of 




Upon comparison of the treatment of one another‟s ethnic community following the „spy 
scandal,‟ clear differences emerge between Russia‟s and Georgia‟s approaches to the 
issue. In contrast to the full-fledged targeting and expulsion of both legal and illegal 
residents on the part of Russia, Georgian officials, media outlets, and citizens responded 
admirably to the tenuous situation, with few reported incidents of discrimination.  
However, anti-Russian sentiments, at least at the elite political level, are still very much 
present among Georgian society, and the consequences of the agitated, negative rhetoric 
towards Russia by several Georgian leaders could lead to an environment of increased 
animosity towards Russian speakers. Without specific steps taken by the Georgian 
government, media outlets, and society as a whole to reduce anti-Russian sentiment, there 
is a danger of further incensed political relations negatively affecting interpersonal 
relations between the ethnic Russian minority and the Georgian majority.  
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